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ABSTRACT: The granting of free allowances by the Member State under 
Directive 2003/87/EC may involve a transfer of State resources for the 
reason that in such cases the State itself foregoes revenues that it could earn, 
were it to auction them. Free of charge allocation of emission allowances in 
the context of the general rule of auctioning of allowances from 2013, has to 
be regarded as an economic advantage, which the recipient undertaking 
would not have obtained under normal market conditions.  If free allocation 
of allowances constitutes State aid in the meaning of Article 107 (1) of the 
TFEU, it will be incompatible with the internal market as a general rule and 
therefore prohibited. The Commission practice and Decisions of the Court of 
Justice considers that Article 107 (3)(c) of the TFEU is the only basis for the 
consideration of free of charge emission allowances as being compatible with 
the internal market. Moreover, we have to take into account if state aid might 
be covered by the scheme of general rules of assessment established in the 
Environmental Guidelines of 2008 and if so, under what conditions.  
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I. Introduction. 
 
The question of involvement of State resources arises also in the context of 
EU´s Emissions Trading Scheme. The EU´s scheme initially provided for a 
pilot phase (Phase I, 2005-2007) and a Phase II (2008-2012) correspond to 
the first commitment period of Kyoto. In the first trading period, it was open 
to Member States to auction up to 5% of the allowances allocated pursuant to 
the different NAPs1. But most Member States choose not to auction this 
percentage therefore foregoing revenue and satisfying the amounts with the 
Member States resources criterion under Article 107 (1) TFEU.  
The chances for a greater potential for aid came along with the second 
trading period. During Phase II allowances must be backed by an Assigned 
Amount Unit (units each equal to one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent) 
which can be traded between Kyoto´s parties; by allocating for free or below 
market price to EU ETS undertakings  Member States are foregoing potential 
revenue from selling those Units2. Considering that Member States are 
obliged by ETS Directive3 to distribute 90% of allowances for free during 
phase II, only 10% could be auctioned so only in those cases and if those 
allowances are distributed for free or below market price we would talk about 
State aid.  Nevertheless, DG of competition has not acted against Member 
States in relation to this matter. As we will see, the Commission has rather 
preferred to deal with matters related with NAP´s approval. 
During Phase III, that is during 2013-2020, there will be little space for State 
Aid. The EU ETS Directive requires 70% of allowances to be auctioned by 
2020, rising to 100% by 20274.   
We will see that the 2009 EU ETS Directive states that Member States´ use of 
auctioning revenues is subject to the State Aid rules, and that information 
                                                     
1 See description in: M.C. ALONSO GARCÍA, “El nuevo régimen jurídico del mercado 
europeo de derechos de emisión de gases de efecto invernadero”,  Actualidad 
Administrativa, 2012, forthcoming.   
2 SEINEN, A.T., State aid aspects of the EU Emission Trading Scheme: the second trading 
period, Competition Policy Newsletter, 3, 2007, pág. 100. 
3 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23th of april 
2009, amending  Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading scheme of the Community, OJ 2009 L140/63. 
4 See Article 10c ETS Directive.  
 5
provided to the Commission on the use of those funds does not mean that 
no notification of aid is necessary under Article 108(3) TFEU5. 
 
Article 107 (1) TFEU defines prohibited State aid as an advantage granted by 
a Member State or through State resources, which actually or potentially 
distort competition policy, favours certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods, and has an effect on trade between Member States. While 
State aid is in principle prohibited (art. 107 (1) TFEU), paragraphs 2 and 3 set 
out ways in wich aid can be exempted from this general prohibition. 
Exemptions are premised on a recognition that markets not always work 
properly alone and that sometimes intervention from State is necessary and 
benefits consumer welfare6. In accordance to it, the Treaty expressly provides 
that for certain non-economic reasons, that include environmental reasons, 
legitimate the grant of State Aid.  
Nevertheless, the Commission has recently develop a more rational approach 
to the conditions in which State aid may be justified, founded on economical 
reasons7 searching for a substancial reduction of state aid8: “8. Further, it is 
important to realize that state aid does not come for free. Nor is state aid a 
miracle solution that can instantly cure all problems. Tax payers in the end 
                                                     
5 ETS Directive, §19.  
6 U. SCHWALBE, “Welfare effects of financing state aid” (2006) European State Aid Law 
Quaterly 55.  
7 Commissioner Kroes, September the 14th 2006, “Industrial Policy and Competition 
Policy” (Speech/06/499, Fordham University School of Law) stated: “My top priority as 
Competition Commissioner has been a comprehensive reform of our state aid rules. Our 
objective is to help Member States to spend only as much taxpayers' money on subsidies 
as is absolutely necessary, and to target that expenditure as effectively as possible. So our 
motto is "less and better targeted state aid". We look first to the markets to deliver, and 
only where there are clear gaps does state aid play a role”. 
And D. HILDEBRAND and A.  SCHWEINSBERG, “Refined economic Approach in European 
State Aid Control-Will it gain Momentum? (2007) 30(3) World Competition  449. 
More recently, the Communication on State aid modernisation (COM(2012) 209 final) may 
the 8th 2012, states that: “The Europe 2020 growth Strategy recognises the role of State 
aid for growth and its capacity "to actively and positively contribute to the Europe 2020 
objectives by prompting and supporting initiatives for more innovative, efficient and 
greener technologies, while facilitating access to public support for investment, risk 
capital and funding for research and development". 
8 Commission´s State Aid action plan, “State aid action plan - Less and better targeted 
state aid: a roadmap for state aid reform 2005–2009 ({SEC(2005) 795}/ COM/2005/0107 
final”, And D. HILDEBRAND and A.  SCHWEINSBERG, “Refined economic Approach in 
European StateAid Control-Will it gain Momentum? (2007) 30(3) World Competition  449. 
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have to finance state aid and there are opportunity costs to it. Giving aid to 
undertakings means taking funding away from other policy areas. State 
resources are limited and they are needed for many essential purposes, such 
as the educational system, the health system, national security, social 
protection and others. It is therefore necessary for Member States to make 
choices transparently and to prioritise action”. Recently, the Communication 
on State aid modernisation (COM(2012) 209 final) may the 8th 2012, states 
that: “The Europe 2020 growth Strategy recognizes the role of State aid for 
growth and its capacity "to actively and positively contribute to the Europe 
2020 objectives by prompting and supporting initiatives for more innovative, 
efficient and greener technologies, while facilitating access to public support 
for investment, risk capital and funding for research and development". 
Therefore, the issue is not whether environmental considerations should be 
taken into account in assessing the compatibility of the State aid with the 
Treaty, this is in general out of question. The problem is to determine the 
right balance ought to be in taking them into account. The Commission´s 
2008 Guidelines on State Aid for environmental Protection, emphasizes the 
important role that State Aid can play in achieving environmental goals9 
considering that environmental protection is an objective of common interest 
which, in some circumstances, may justify the granting of State aid. 
  
 The question that arise in this moment is whether the emissions 
trading schemes can or should be considered as State Aid and if so not 
compatible with the Treaty. 
 
II. Some general remarks regarding EU´s regime? 
 
First of all, the analysis of the existence of an aid regarding the approval of 
the National Allocation Plans by the Commission, does not replace nor repeal 
the application of the procedures laid down in articles 107 and 108 TFEU10. In 
                                                     
9 See Guidelines, § 5-14. 
10 M. MEROLA and G. CRICHLOW, “State Aid in the Framework of the EU Position after 
Kyoto: an analysis of Allowances granted under the Co2 Emissions Allowance Trading 
Directive”, (2004) 27 (1)World Competition 25; M. LORENZ, “Emission Trading-The State 
Aid Dimension” (2004) European State Aid Law Quaterly 399; M. TORRE-SCHAUB, “La 
naissance d´un nouveau marché: le système britannique de commerce d´allocations 
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analyzing the National Allocation Plans the Commission make a prima facie 
exam of any aid that may contain these plans but does not apply the 
procedure set out in the TFEU, but the one of Directive 2003/87/EC (of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 october 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
community and amending council directive 96/61/EC).  In fact article 9.3 of 
Directive 2003/87/CE states that: “Within three months of notification of a 
national allocation plan by a Member State under paragraph 1, the 
Commission may reject that plan, or any aspect thereof, on the basis that it 
is incompatible with the criteria listed in Annex III or with Article 10. The 
Member State shall only take a decision under Article 11(1) or (2) if proposed 
amendments are accepted by the Commission. Reasons shall be given for any 
rejection decision by the Commission”.  
So, Directive does not contain a general prohibition nor recognize an 
exception. Therefore the Commission preliminary assessment valuation of 
the National Allocation Plans should not be regarded as definitive. In the 
Order of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber), 30 April 2007, Case T-
387/04 Energie Baden Wuerttemberg AG vs. Commission, the CFI stated: “In 
the first place, although it is true that Directive 2003/87/EC, in particular the 
fifth criterion in Annex III thereof, itself envisages the possibility of conflicts 
between the provisions of a NAP and the rules on State aid, and therefore 
requires the Commission to take account of those rules in the review 
procedure under  Article 9(3) of the directive. In addition, it cannot be 
excluded that, under certain circumstances, notification of a NAP under the 
second subparagraph of Article 9(3) of Directive 2003/87 might also 
constitute notification for the purposes of Article 88(3) EC, or might even 
have to be regarded as such” (§132). As for that, it does not eliminate the 
possibility of applying if necessary the procedure of articles 107 and 108 
TFEU11, as confirmed by the Order mentioned above.  
                                                                                                                                                 
d´emissions de gaz à effet de serre”, (2004) Revue International de droit économique 227; 
S. WEISHAAR, Towards Auctioning: the transformation of the European Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading System: present and future Challenges to Competition Law, Kluwer, 
2009. 
11 A. JOHNSTON, “Free allocation of allowances under EU emissions Trading scheme: legal 
issues”, Climate Policy, 6/2006, pág. 119; A. T. SEINEN, “State aid aspects of the EU 
Emission Trading Scheme: the second trading period”, Competition Policy Newsletter, 3, 
2007, pág. 100. 
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The order specifies the procedures to follow and the criteria to take into 
account in assessing state aid under the National Allocation Plan 
implementation of agreements with the criteria set out in Annex III of 
Directive 2003/8712. In the order of the Court of First Instance (Third 
Chamber), 30 April 2007, it is stated that:  
 
"(20):  Under Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/87, allowances are to be 
valid only for emissions during the period for which they are issued;  
(21) In a joint letter from the Directors General of DG Environment and 
DG Competition to the Member States, dated 17 March 2004, on the 
subject of 'State Aid and [NAPs]', the Commission set out the 
procedures to be followed and the criteria of which it intended to take 
account in assessing possible State aid granted in the context of the 
implementation of NAPs in accordance with the criteria laid down in 
Annex III to Directive 2003/87”. 
 
In the letter above mentionned of march 200413, the Commission indicated  
that Phase I allocations would not be review for compliance with the State aid 
rules, but not such assurance was given for Phase II. 
 
III. Do NAP constitute State aid? 
 
 In several Decisions, adopted before the approval of the Directive, the 
Commission found that the grant of allowances constituted aid without 
analysis of selectivity, as long as the criteria or elements of the definition of 
aid established in articles 87.1 EC (107.1 TFEU) were met. For example, in UK 
Emission Trading Scheme,14 the UK´s allocation of free emissions trading 
allowances (pre-EU ETS) along with the incentives paid to undertakings to 
participate in the trading scheme15 that the national emissions trading 
scheme included, was found to constitute aid. Specifically, “The state thus 
                                                     
12 Order of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber), 30 April 2007, Case T-387/04 
Energie Baden Wuerttemberg AG vs. 
13 Letter of 17 march 2004, HNV C2/PV/amh/D (2004) 420149. 
14 Case N416/01. 
15 See, Commission letter of 28 th November 2001(Brussels, 28.11.2001 C(2001)3739 
fin),“The UK Government will make available an incentive totalling £43m per annum 
(£30m net of tax) for five years, spread across all entities entering the trading scheme 
taking on absolute emissions targets on the basis of the greenhouse gases (GHGs) they 
emit both directly or indirectly within the UK.” 
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provides these companies with an intangible asset for free, which can be sold 
on a market to be created. The fact that there will be a market is a sign of the 
value of the asset being allocated. This has to be considered to be an 
advantage to the recipient companies”.  
“The value of these permits is predicted to be considerable. By the envisaged 
arrangements, the State foregoes revenue, which could derive from 
auctioning the emission permits”. Despite the fact that the free allocation of 
allowances constituted and advantage from State resources, the Commission 
decided to consider the aid compatible with article 87.3 EC Treaty based on 
the idea that the scheme makes a valuable contribution to environmental 
policy (whyle not affecting adversely trading conditions). Nevertheless, the 
Commission stated on the one hand that the scheme is not the preferred 
option of the Commission and, secondly, that it should be probably modified 
once the Directive is approved.  
A similar solution was adopted regarding the Danish Emissions Trading 
Scheme16 for the period 2001-2003 and its free allocation of transferable 
emissions permits to electricity producers established by the Danish 
government. The arrangements were considered to constitute aid granted by 
a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever. But, the 
Commission stated also that aids pursuing environmental objectives must 
normally be assessed in the light of the Community guidelines on State aid 
for environmental protection. “However, the current guidelines do not take 
into account such a new form of State intervention as a system of tradable 
emission permits. Therefore, the Commission has assessed the Danish 
system for trade in CO2 emission permits on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) EC, 
and has decided that an exemption can be granted”17. 
 Concerning measure C 18/2001 (ex case N123/2000), United 
Kingdom, Climate Change Levy for the free allocation of allowances for 
companies entering into Climate Change Agreements. The levy was 
introduced in order to help meet the UK's international greenhouse gas 
abatement obligations and to progress towards the goal of reducing CO2 
                                                     
16 Case N653/99 (Decisions 29/3/2000, 28/11/2001 and 24/6/2003). See Commission 
letter of 12th april 2000 (Bruxelles, den 12.04.2000 SG(2000) 508).  
17 See Commission letter of 12th april 2000 (Bruxelles, den 12.04.2000 SG(2000) 508).  
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emissions. It covered the use of fuel for lighting, heating and motive power 
in industry, commerce, agriculture, public administration and other services. 
The Commission decision not to raise objections to four types of exemptions 
either because they were not deemed to be State aid (exemption for 
electricity from renewable sources and for Good Quality CHP) or else because 
they were compatible with Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty (exemption for 
public transport and rail freight, exemption for companies entering into 
Climate Change agreements) - gives clearance for the implementation of the 
major elements of the Climate Change Levy. However, on one point, the 
Commission decided to open the formal State aid investigation procedure. 
Under the current UK legislation, energy used partly for fuel purposes and 
partly for non-fuel purposes, for example in a chemical reduction, will be 
exempt from the CCL. The Commission wanted to consider further whether 
this exemption constituted State aid and, if so, whether it was compatible 
with the Community's State aid rules.  
 
In all those early Decisions, the Commission stated that the requirements of 
article 87.1 EC Treaty (article 107.1 TFEU) were ment. The state allocates a 
number of transferable emission permits free of charge to undertakings. So, 
she considered that the State thus provides an intangible asset for free, 
which can be sold on a market to be created. The fact that there will be a 
market is a sign of the value of the asset being allocated, so it is considered 
as an advantage. By those arrangements, the State forgoes revenue, which 
could derive from auctioning the emission permits. The granting of this 
advantage involved a transfer of state resources, and finally, the Commission 
considered that the advantage in question were selective, affecting trade 
between MS and distorting or threatening to distort the market. Therefore, 
the Commission assessed in different cases that emission permits on the 
basis of Article 87(3)(c) EC, and decided that an exemption could be granted.  
 
In fact, in order to consider allocation of allowances as state aid in the sense 
of the Treaty, it is necessary that the following conditions are met: 
-there must be free or at least, at a price lower than the fees paid in the 
market and affect the state´s resources 
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- aids must be selective, affecting trade between States and distort 
competition. 
 
In all those early Decisions, the Commission did not analyse the selectivity 
criteria.  
 
IV. The problem of the selectivity criteria. 
 
However, since those Decisions, the issue of selectivity has become 
very contentious.  
The first decision of the ECJ on the allocation of allowances and their 
relationship with state aid does not refer to the national allocation plans but 
the legislation transposing the Directive 2001/81/EC of Parliament and the 
Council of 23 October 2001 on national emission schemes for certain 
atmospheric pollutants, which requires states not exceed certain ceilings of 
emissions of various compounds in their respective territories, that the 
Netherlands embodied in a market in emission rights. In Netherlands v. 
Commission18, the Court annulled the Commission Decision of 24 June 200319 
by declaring that the market for emitting nitrogen oxides created by the 
Dutch State constituted aid compatible with the common market. The 
Kingdom of the Netherlands puts forward two pleas alleging the infringement 
first, of Article 87 EC, and second, of the requirement to state reasons.   
                                                     
18 Case T-233/04, CFI april the 10th  2008. 
19 Netherlands sought the annulment of the Decision on the grounds that it was not a real 
help and therefore was not subject to the reporting and notification requirements of Art. 
108 TFEU. 
In its Decision the Commission stated that “…accordingly decided that the NOx emission 
trading scheme constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. 
In addition the Commission concludes that such aid is compatible with the common 
market in accordance with Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty and Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA 
Agreement. By taking this decision, the Commission considers that the scheme makes a 
valuable contribution to the Community environmental policy while not adversely affecting 
trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. It remains that the 
scheme is not the preferred option of the Commission, especially as regards the ‘dynamic 
cap’, according to which the environmental outcome is more uncertain and the costs of 
administration and compliance are higher than in a ‘cap and trade’ system. The Dutch 
authorities are requested to provide the Commission annually with a report on the 
implementation of the aid. Any change in the conditions under which the aid is granted 
must be notified in advance”. 
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Regarding the first plea, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, supported by the 
Federal Republic of Germany, claims that the measure in question does not 
constitute an advantage financed through State resources and, in the 
alternative, that the condition of selectivity is not fulfilled.  
After analysing the meaning of state aid, according to what the 
General Court considers that : 
 
65: “The notion of aid can encompass not only positive benefits such 
as subsidies, loans or direct investment in the capital of enterprises, 
but also interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges 
which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and 
which therefore, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the 
word, are of the same character and have the same effect”.  
66: “It therefore follows that a measure which grants certain 
undertakings an advantage entailing an additional burden for the 
public authorities in the form of a de facto waiver of public debts, 
exemption from the obligation to pay fines or other pecuniary 
penalties can constitute a State aid”. 
 
In paragraph 66 above mentioned, it is indicated that a measure that 
gives an advantage to certain undertakings involving an additional burden for 
the public authorities in the form of a State guarantee, a de facto waiver of 
public debts, exemption from the obligation to pay fines o other pecuniary 
penalties, or a reduced rate of tax, must be regarded as giving rise to the 
grant of State aid, within the meaning of Article 87 EC Treaty (Article 107 
TFEU)20. Because those emission rights have a market value21: advantages 
granted for free directly or indirectly through State resources or constituting 
an additional charge for the State or for bodies designated or established by 
the State for that purpose can be sold, as they are tradable credits, and 
therefore have a market value.  
  
As stated in the Judgment Piaggio of the Court of Justice of june the 17th of 
1999, paragraph 43:  
                                                     
20 See, to that effect, Case C-295/97 Piaggio [1999] ECR I-3735, paragraphs 42 and 43. 
Judgement of the Court of Justice, 17th june 1999. 
21 S.WEISHAAR, The European emissions Trading system and State aid: an Assessment of 
the Grandfathering Allocation Method and the Performance Standard Rate System, ECLR 
6/2007, pág. 374. 
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“In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that application to an 
undertaking of a system of the kind introduced by Law No 95/79, and 
derogating from the rules of ordinary law relating to insolvency, is to be 
regarded as giving rise to the grant of State aid, within the meaning of Article 
92(1) of the Treaty, where it is established that the undertaking  
-    has been permitted to continue trading in circumstances in which it would 
not have been permitted to do so if the rules of ordinary law relating to 
insolvency had been applied, or  
-    has enjoyed one or more advantages, such as a State guarantee, a 
reduced rate of tax, exemption from the obligation to pay fines and other 
pecuniary penalties or de facto waiver of public debts wholly or in part, which 
could not have been claimed by another insolvent undertaking under the 
application of the rules of ordinary law relating to insolvency.” 
It is in the light of those principles that the Court must examine whether the 
measure in question confers on its beneficiaries an advantage financed 
through State resources. 
In respect of the existence of an advantage financed through State resources 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands pointed out that he “does not directly grant 
emission allowances to the undertakings concerned, nor does it limit itself to 
imposing on them a binding emission standard”. But, “it authorises the 
undertakings subject to that standard to trade between themselves the 
emission allowances which indirectly result from that standard, up to the 
limit of the ceiling applicable to each of them. By making those allowances 
tradable, the Kingdom of the Netherlands confers on them a market value. 
Any undertaking coming within the scheme may sell them at any time”.  
“Consequentely, the measure in question constitutes, in accordance with the 
case-law cited in paragraphs 63 to 66 above, an advantage granted to the 
undertakings concerned through State resources”.  
 
As to the selectivity criteria, the parties considered that the emissions trading 
scheme was not selective as the scheme was applied on the basis of an 
objective criterion. In fact, the scheme was based on the nitrous oxide 
national emissions ceiling for the Netherlands established by Directive 
2001/81. Implementation of that ceiling was set out in Dutch legislation for 
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all industrial facilities with an installed thermal capacity of more than 20 
MWth22. The undertaking could comply with the emissions standards by 
taking steps to reduce those emissions in its own facility or by buying 
emissions allowances from other undertakings (offered in the market by 
those facilities whose emissions fell below the emissions standard23), or by a 
combination of both. The involvement of the State was limited to setting the 
emissions standards and authorising trading.   
Nevertheless, this argument was rejected by the Court of Justice the 
“contention contradicts the description of the measure in question. 
According to the description, the calculation of the emission standard 
provided for by the measure in question and the fines which are imposed 
when it is exceeded concern only the facilities covered by the scheme (see 
                                                     
22 Similarly, see, 2002/676/EC,ECSC: Commission Decision of 3 April 2002 on the dual-use 
exemption which the United Kingdom is planning to implement under the Climate Change 
Levy and the extended exemption for certain competing processes. The Commission 
believes that “dual-use exemption which the United Kingdom is planning to implement 
under the climate change levy, instituted by Section 30 and Schedules 6 and 7 of the 
United Kingdom Finance Act 2000, does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 
87(1) of the EC Treaty or point (c) of Article 4 of the ECSC Treaty. The exemption for less 
environmentally damaging processes, namely recycling production processes that 
compete directly with primary production processes falling within the scope of the non-
fuel or dual-use exemption, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the 
Treaty. However, the aid meets the conditions for exemption under Article 87(3)(c) of the 
Treaty and is therefore compatible with the common market.” (OJ 2002 L229/15). 
The Commission found that regarding Case N 550/2000, Belgian Green Electricity 
Certificates, doesn´t constitute aid. It refers to a Rule of july the 17th 2000, regarding the 
organization of the electricity market, a several measures to stimulate the generation of 
electricity from renewable energy sources, adopted for a 10 years period. See OJ 2001 C-
330/3. 
23 Case T-233/04; Judgment of the Court of First Instance, april the 10th 2008: 
“10. In paragraph 1 of the contested decision, the Commission first describes the measure 
in question. In the framework of the NO
x
 national emission ceiling for the Netherlands 
established by Directive 2001/81, the Netherlands authorities set a target of 55 
kilotonnes of NO
x
 emissions for its large industrial facilities, that is approximately 250 
undertakings, to be attained by 2010. 
11. Regarding the working of the scheme, the Commission explains in paragraph 1.2 of 
the contested decision that Netherlands legislation will lay down a NO
x
 emission standard 
for each industrial facility. The undertaking can comply with the emission standard thus 
laid down by taking steps to reduce NO
x
 emissions in its own facility, by buying emission 
allowances from other undertakings, or by a combination of those options. Emission 
reductions, in the form of NO
x
 credits, will be offered in the emission market by facilities 
whose emissions fall below the emission standard.  
12. A facility’s total annual NO
x
 emission, adjusted for any NO
x
 credits sold or bought, 
must comply with the authorised emission level for that facility. The authorised annual 
emission – as an absolute figure – is calculated on the basis of the emission standard 
concerned and the amount of energy used by that facility.”  
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paragraphs 10 to 16 above)”24. Rather, “ecological considerations justify 
distinguishing undertakings which emit large quantities of NO
x
 from other 
undertakings (see, to that effect, Adria-Wien Pipeline and 
Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke, cited in paragraph 80 above, 
paragraphs 49 and 52). The implementation of those principles must take 
into account Article 6 EC in conjunction with Article 87 EC”25.  
 
Having regard to the foregoing, the measure can not be considered as state 
aid. The Court considered that it was not necessary to rule on the second 
plea and therefore decided to annul the contested Decision as she 
understood that the aid was compatible:   
the Court applied the traditional doctrine under which to understand that this 
is an advantage it is not necessary to disburse state funds but also simply 
lack of income in certain circumstances.  
With those assets the Kingdom of the Netherlands put at the disposal of the 
undertakings concerned free of charge,  he is conferring an advantage (§ 63-
78). Moreover, such advantage was granted through State resources, as the 
allowances were put at the disposal of the undertakings concerned free of 
charge, whereas they could have been sold or put up for auction26.  
 
However, the matter regarding Netherlands vs. Commission, the Commission 
of the European Communities requested the Court to set aside the judgment 
of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities of 10 April 2008 
in Case T-233/04 Netherlands v Commission by which the General Court 
annulled Commission Decision of 24 June 2003 on State aid N 35/2003 
concerning the emission trading scheme for nitrogen oxides notified by the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Kingdom of the Netherlands requests the 
Court to set aside the judgment under appeal to the extent that the first plea 
in law submitted by that State, concerning the absence of an advantage 
                                                     
24 Case T-233/04; Judgment of the Court of First Instance, april the 10th 2008, § 91. 
25 Case T-233/04; Judgment of the Court of First Instance, april the 10th 2008, § 99. 
26 Case T-233/04; Judgment of the Court of First Instance, april the 10th 2008, § 75-76. As 
mentioned in the Order, this case was distinguishable from Belgian Electricity Certificates, 
where “the Commission had taken the view that that the green certificates provided only 
official proof of the production of the green electricity and that the State had therefore not 
agreed to forgo resources in providing them free of charge to the producers”.  
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financed by State resources, is rejected. The Judgement, currently under 
appeal, Advocate General Mengozzi has endorsed the General Court´s 
approach on this point in his Opinion of December the 22nd of 201027. Under 
this Opinion, it would seem that any emission trading scheme will involve -as 
a rule- conferral of an advantage from State resources provided that there is 
an option so that the Belgian Electricity Green Certificates will rarely apply. 
Following similar reasoning, the Commission  has found that UK´s emissions 
trading scheme for carbon dioxide emissions linked to energy consumption 
conferred an advantage, as revenues paid for permits were in part recycled 
back to these undertakings as subsidies28.  
“26. However the Commission appealed the NOx judgement of the Court and 
is of the opinion hat the advantage involved in this trading scheme and the 
advantage involved in the related recycling mechanism is a positive benefit 
which by its nature cannot be non selective because only some companies 
can benefit from it. In addition, regardless of the outcome of the appeal to 
the European Court of Justice, the Commission considers that it will not have 
an impact on the assessment of the existence of aid in the case at hand 
because the scheme involves in any event selective advantage involved in the 
payments which the best performing companies receive above what they pay 
for allowances”.  
 
V. To what extend allowances granted by Member States under EU 
´s ETS may be considered selective? 
 
The first question that arise is whether undertakings within or without 
the EU ETS to be considered “in a legal and factual situation that is 
comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question” 
as mentioned in the Decisions and Judgments ment before. The answer to 
that question can only be one: no. Non-ETS undertakings and ETS 
undertakings are not comparable; the first ones, are subject to a special 
regime as a market price is placed on their pollution; on the contrary, non-
                                                     
27 Available at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-279/08&language=en.  
28 Case N629/2008, see Commission letter Brussels, 13.7.2009 (C(2009) 5523 final).  
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ETS undertakings, don´t have such a price placed on their polluting 
activities29.  
In Danish CO2 Refund, the Commission agreed with this view, taking into 
account that the scheme proposed to refund all or part of the Danish carbon 
dioxide tax in the case of EU ETS undertakings constituted State Aid30: 
 
“The Danish authorities argue that the proposed tax relief does not 
confer a selective advantage on the beneficiaries, since it covers all 
undertakings that are legally and factually in the same situation, 
namely those who are the subject of double regulation. Should it be 
assumed, however, that it is a case of selective advantage, the Danish 
authorities find this justified by the nature and structure of the 
system. This is because the CO2 tax and the EU ETS have the same 
objective, i.e. to reduce CO2 emissions. Since the EU ETS was 
introduced the CO2 tax no longer serves any environmental purpose. 
For companies covered by the EU ETS, the CO2 tax is therefore not an 
effective instrument for reducing the overall CO2 emissions, but 
merely an extra economic burden.” 
 
“The Commission notes that it was established in the Adria-Wien judgment31 
that ‘the only question to be determined is whether, under a particular 
statutory scheme, a State measure is such as to favour certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the 
Treaty in comparison with other undertakings which are in a legal and factual 
situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the 
measure in question’. There is recent case-law32 on the interpretation of 
advantage and selectivity. The Gibraltar33 judgment offered a standard State 
aid analysis for tax cases. The Court of First Instance held that such an 
analysis should consist of: (1) the identification of the system of reference; 
                                                     
29 A.T. SEINEN, State aid aspects of the EU Emission Trading Scheme: the second trading 
period, Competition Policy Newsletter, 3, 2007,100. 
30 Commission Decision of 17th June 2009 on aid scheme 41/06 (ex N 318/A/04) which 
Denmark is planning to implement for refunding the CO2 tax on quota-regulated fuel 
consumption in industry (notified under document C(2009) 4517), OJ 2009 L345/18. 
31 November 2001 in Case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer &Peggauer 
Zementwerke v Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten [2001] ECRI-8365.  
32 Judgment by the Court of First Instance of 10 April 2008 in CaseT-233/04, Netherlands 
v Commission (‘the NOx-judgment’), [2008]ECR II-591, judgment of 22 December 2008 in 
Case C-487/06 P, the British Aggregates Association v Commission.  
33 Judgment of 18 December 2008 in joined Cases T-211/04 andT-215/04, Gibraltar v 
Commission.  
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(2) the determination of the derogation from that system of reference; and 
(3) the possibility of justification of the derogation by the nature or structure 
of the system.”   
 
The result was that the measures could not be view as constituting the 
reference system for assessing whether undertakings were treated in a 
similar manner and therefore the exemption was not justified by the nature 
and logic of the tax system34.  Some authors have criticized the Commission 
conclusion regarding the possibility that the EU ETS have as its goal the 
collection of revenue. In fact, they consider that there is a contradiction 
between this reasoning and the EU ETS Directive. Under the Directive, 
substantial revenue derives from auctioning35.  
 
 The second question that arise regards the possibility for Member 
States to distinguish between undertakings on the basis of other criteria, 
such as sector, or others.  
  
VI. Exemption for environmental aid: article 107 (3) TFEU. 
 
Currently, 2008 Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental 
Protection36, recognises that tradable permit schemes may involve aid in 
different ways setting out two methods of State aid assesment for tradable 
permits. Guidelines set the limits and conditions for the free allocation of 
allowances to be classified as State aid compatible with Community 
competition law. The premise of the Guidelines seem to be that all Phase II 
allowances constitute State Aid. 
In fact, some of the factors stated in article 107 (3) c) TFEU are fundamental 
in order to assess selectivity. As regards Phase I and in order to fall under 
article 107(3) c) TFEU, the Guidelines state that Member State allocation of 
                                                     
34 Decision of 17th June 2009, §45. 
35 Article 10 (3) EU ETS states that: “Member States shall determine the use of revenues 
generated from the auctioning of allowances. At least 50 % of the revenues generated 
from the auctioning of allowances referred to in paragraph 2, including all revenues from 
the auctioning referred to in paragraph 2, points (b) and (c), other equivalent in financial 
value of these revenues, should be used”.  
36  2008/C 82/01, OJ  C82, 1st April 2008. 
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allowances must be carried out in a transparent way37, based on objective 
criteria and not favour certain undertakings or certain sectors unless this is 
justified by the environmental goals or policies themselves, as established in 
criterion five Annex III Directive 2003/87/EC: “The plan shall not discriminate 
between companies or sectors in such a way as to unduly favour certain 
undertakings or activities in accordance with the requirements of the Treaty, 
in particular Articles 87 and 88 thereof”. This concords with the allocation 
criteria set out in the Directive itself and with the Commission approach. In 
that sense, the Order of the Court of Justice of 30rd of april  2007 (case T-
387/04), discussed in detail above, Commission letter confirming that 
German Phase I NAP probably would be compatible with State Aids under 
Article 108 (3) TFEU. Similarly and regarding Phase II, we find the same 
criteria: transparency, objectivity and no discrimination which are all 
elements that form part of the selectivity analysis. If those criteria are 
fulfilled, aid can not be considered as selective. Taking into account this 
Commission´s approach, it seems that it is always necessary an analysis that 
combines article 107(1) and 107 (3) TFEU. In that sense, and regarding 
allowances in Phase I and II, the distinction between both paragraphs of 
article 107 TFEU is relevant due to the difference about the burden of proof: 
elements of article 107 (1) TFUE must be proved by the Commission and 
elements of article 107(3) TFEU by Member States. In Phase III, the State Aid 
rules will apply occasionally, where allowances are not allocated neither by 
auction nor to the Commission´s harmonised allocation rules.  
Two further elements must be taken into account in analysing state aid: 
distortion of competition and effect on trade between Member States. In 
doing so, de minimis thresholds and rules must be considerate (Commission 
Regulation EN núm. 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of 
articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid38). That is, distortion on 
competition must be limited so the overall balance has to be positive39. "(36) 
                                                     
37 See I. FERNÁNDEZ and M.D. UTRILLA, “The allocation of limited authorisations in Spain: 
considerations from the analysis of three specific sectors”, in this book. 
38 OJ 2006, L379/5. 
39 The 2008 Guidelines,§ 32: “The Commission should review the functioning of Directive 
2003/87/EC in relation to aviation activities in the light of experience of its application 
and should then report to the European Parliament and the Council.” 
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If environmental State aid measures are well targeted to counterweigh only 
the actual extra costs linked to a higher level of environmental protection, 
the risk that the aid will unduly distort competition is normally rather limited. 
Consequently, it is crucial that environmental State aid measures are well 
targeted. In cases where aid is not necessary or proportionate to achieve its 
intended objective it will harm competition. This may in particular be the 
case if aid leads to: 
a) maintaining inefficient firms afloat; 
b) distorting dynamic incentives/crowding out; 
c) creating market power or exclusionary practices; 
d) artificially altering trade flows or the location of production."40 
 
 
The 2008 Guidelines take into account a very economic approach as we have 
already mentioned. We can make two relevant considerations regarding those 
Guidelines: 1) Member State aid can play an important role in achieving 
environmental goals and 2) it is important to achieve integration between EU 
Members for the environmental policies. Let´s see what the Commission´s 
approach to environmental aid is. 
 
The first method relates to the EU´s ETS scheme up to 2012. In this case, in 
order to limit the distortion of competition, no over allocation is permitted 
nor provisions can not create undue barriers to entry.  
First of all, it seems that aid should be exempted if it incentives pollution 
reduction or if it creates other incentives to achieve a higher level 
environmental protection as stated in 2008 Guidelines: “The primary 
objective of State aid control in the field of environmental protection is to 
                                                     
40 The 2008 Guidelines, §36: “In particular, the Commission should be empowered to 
adopt measures for the auctioning of allowances not required to be issued for free; to 
adopt detailed rules on the operation of the special reserve for certain aircraft operators 
and on the procedures relating to requests for the Commission to decide on the 
imposition of an operating ban on an aircraft operator; and to amend the aviation 
activities listed in Annex I where a third country introduces measures to reduce the 
climate change impact of aviation. Since those measures are of general scope and are 
designed to amend non-essential elements of this Directive, inter alia, by supplementing 
this Directive with new non-essential elements, they must be adopted in accordance with 
the regulatory procedure with scrutiny provided for in Article 5a of Decision 
1999/468/EC.” 
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ensure that State aid measures will result in a higher level of environmental 
protection than would occur without the aid and to ensure that the positive 
effects of the aid outweigh its negative effects in terms of distortions of 
competition, taking account of the polluter pays principle (hereafter "PPP") 
established by Article 174 of the EC Treaty” (paragraph 6).  
  Thus, when the assignment is below market value (which is always assumed 
that there is free allocation) it is State aid. However, there may be reasons to 
make convenient the existence of such aid: it can be used to target negative 
externalities by introducing market-based instruments for environmental 
objectives but can never assume all the needs of the facility, and companies 
must reduce their pollution or buy more rights on the market.  
There is no chance or marge for over-allocation to one or more facilities. 
Thus, to the extent that they contribute to the internalization of the damage 
caused by greenhouse gases, and in accordance with the principle “polluter 
pays” they may never get to meet the total needs of the facility because then 
there would be no internalization but would the community assume the 
entire cost of pollution.  
 
“Tradable permit schemes may involve State aid in various ways, for example, 
when Member States grant permits and allowances below their market value 
and this is imputable to Member States. This type of aid may be used to 
target negative externalities by allowing market-based instruments targeting 
environmental objectives to be introduced. If the global amount of permits 
granted by the Member State is lower than the global expected needs of 
undertakings, the overall effect on the level of environmental protection will 
be positive. At the individual level of each undertaking, if the allowances 
granted do not cover the totality of expected needs of the undertaking, the 
undertaking must either reduce its pollution, thus contributing to the 
improvement of the level of environmental protection, or buy supplementary 
allowances on the market, thus paying a compensation for its pollution. To 
limit the distortion of competition, no over-allocation of allowances can be 
justified and provision must be made to avoid undue barriers to entry.” (§55 
2008 Community Guidelines). 
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In short, free allocation of allowances is only admissible if it is lower than the 
needs of the facilities because this way they are forced to reduce emissions 
or buy more allowances on the market. Thus, over-allocation constitute a 
prohibited aid.  
 
Once these general criteria of admissibility of aid are fixed, the Guidelines 
determine the specific criteria to allow the Commission to declare aid 
compatible with European law that is, the balancing test. As Paragraph 16 of 
the 2008 Guidelines state: “In assessing whether an aid measure can be 
deemed compatible with the common market, the Commission balances the 
positive impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common 
interest against its potentially negative side effects, such as distortion of 
trade and competition. The State Aid Action Plan, building on existing 
practice, has formalised this balancing exercise in what has been termed a 
"balancing test". It operates in three steps; the first two steps address the 
positive effects of the State aid and the third addresses the negative effects 
and resulting balancing of the positive and negative effects”.  
State aid may be declared compatible with the common market (Art. 107.3 
TFEU) if provisions of article 140 a)-d) of the 2008 Guidelines fulfillment of 
the provisions of art. 140 a)-d) of the Community Guidelines 2008 are 
fulfilled.  
 
The tradable permit schemes must be set up in such a way as to achieve 
environmental objectives beyond those intended to be achieved on the basis 
of Community standards that are mandatory for the undertakings concerned. 
The aid must be designed to “deliver the objective of common interest” which 
includes protection of the environment. Aid must be an appropriate policy 
instrument (“State aid for environmental protection must result in the 
recipient of the aid changing its behaviour so that the level of environmental 
protection will be higher than if the aid had not been granted”, § 27). It is 
also required that the objective is not attainable without the aid and that has 
led to the doctrine of eligible costs41, this means that only costs exceeding 
                                                     
41 S. KINGSTON, Greening EU Competition Law and Policy, 408.  
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the benefits an undertaking receives for its investments can be exempted. 
Further more, to be proportionate aid must be inferior than the eligible test42. 
the allocation must be carried out in a transparent way, based on objective 
criteria and on data sources of the highest quality available.  
the allocation methodology must not be selective. 
new entrants shall not in principle receive permits or allowances on more 
favourable conditions than existing undertakings operating on the same 
markets43.                                                                                                                                  
 
 The Commission will apply those criteria taking into account the rules 
set out in the ETS Directive and in the different Communication documents. 
 
 The second method of assesments refers to post-2012 ETS period and 
national tradable permit schemes. The criteria that the Commission will use 
refers to measures that are necessary and proportional.  
Paragraph 56 of 2008 Community Guidelines, state that: "The criteria set out 
in point 55 from the basis for the Commission’s assessment of situations 
arising during the trad- ing period ending on 31 December 2012. With 
respect to situations arising during the trading period after that date, the 
Commission will assess the measures according to whether they are both 
                                                     
42 Guidelines 2008, (32)" However, it is difficult to fully take into account all economic 
benefits which a company will derive from an additional investment. For example, 
according to the methodology for calculating eligible costs set out in points 80 to 84, 
operating benefits are not taken into account beyond a certain initial period following the 
investment. Likewise, certain kinds of benefits which are not always easy to measure — 
such as the "green image" enhanced by an environmental investment — are not taken into 
account in this context either. Consequently, in order for the aid to be proportionate, the 
Commission considers that the aid amount must normally be less than the eligible 
investment costs, see Annex. It is only in cases where investment aid is granted in a 
genuinely competitive bidding process on the basis of clear, transparent and non 
discriminatory criteria — effectively ensuring that the aid is limited to the minimum 
necessary for achieving the environmental gain — that the aid amount may reach 100 % of 
the eligible investment cost. This is because under such circumstances it can be assumed 
that the respective bids reflect all possible benefits that might flow from the additional 
investment." 
43 See Decision 653/99, 29th march 2000, CO2 quotas- Denmark (Bruxelles, den 
12.04.2000 SG(2000) 508). In relation to this Decision, the Danish authorities will ensure 
that if there are new entrants on the Danish electricity market during the operation of the 
scheme, these will receive quotas based on criteria that are objective and non-
discriminatory in relation to those applied to incumbent producers. The criteria are 
subject to approval by the Commission. Precisely it is stated in that Decision that: “New 
entrants on the market after the introduction of the system will receive emission permits 
based on non-discriminatory criteria”. 
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necessary and proportional. Finally, this will inform the revision of these 
Guidelines taking into account, in particular, the new Directive on the EU CO2 
Emission Trading System, for the trading period after 31 December 2012". 
 
 In particular, paragraph 141 of the 2008 Community Guidelines, state 
that:  
"The Commission will assess the necessity and proportionality of State aid 
involved in a tradable permit scheme according to the following criteria: 
the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent 
criteria, and the aid must be granted in principle in the same way for all 
competitors in the same sector/relevant market if they are in a similar factual 
situation; 
full auctioning must lead to a substantial increase in production costs for 
each sector  or category of individual beneficiaries; 
the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to 
customers without leading to important sales reductions. This analysis may 
be conducted on the basis of estimations of inter alia the product price 
elasticity of the sector concerned. These estimations will be made in the 
relevant geographic market. To evaluate whether the cost increase from the 
tradable permit scheme cannot be passed on to customers, estimates of lost 
sales as well as their impact on the profitability of the company may be used; 
it is not possible for individual undertakings in the sector to reduce emission 
levels in order to make the price of the certificates bearable. Irreducible 
consumption may be demonstrated by providing the emission levels derived 
from best performing technique in the European Economic Area (hereafter 
‘EEA’) and using it as a benchmark. Any undertaking reaching the best 
performing technique can benefit at most from an allowance corresponding 
to the increase in production cost from the tradable permit scheme using the 
best performing technique, and which cannot be passed on to customers. 
Any undertaking having a worse environmental performance shall benefit 
from a lower allowance, proportionate to its environmental performance." 
 
 Polluter Pays principle is the key for this period as there will be less 
space for State aid. Regarding National Trade Schemes the Commission 
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understood that UK´s emissions trading scheme did not fall under the 2008 
Guidelines and was compatible the EU State rules on the basis of article 
107(3) (c) TFEU44 (similarly in case: Danish CO2 Rebates as the Commission 
took inspiration from the criteria set out herein45).  
 
As for Spain, the case law of the Supreme Court46 reveals that the main 
failure on the implementation of the system in Spain has been the lack of 
motivation: in a number of judgments the Court has annulled individual 
assignments because the Council of Ministers did not make explicit the 
reasons for the allocation of a certain amount of rights; so, among others, 
the judgments of 23 and 24 September 2008, 9-14-20 July 2010, 8 October 
2010, 16 November 2010, 28 December 2010 and 25 January 2011. As 
stated by the Supreme Court in its Judgment of 29 May 2009, both Plans and 
individual allocations must be properly motivated, being the requirement of 
motivation applicable with respect to the two phases of assignments in 
accordance with EU law. Some of the Supreme Court Decisions refers to 
                                                     
44 Case 629/2008, Carbon Reduction Commitment: “35. The scheme is designed and its 
modalities are directly and exclusively aimed at protecting environment through the re 
distribution of resources in favour of undertakings which protect the environment the 
most. The revenue is recycled back to participants not to provide allowances for free or to 
purely compensate for the cost of allowances, but as a key driver for high performance 
within the scheme, and thus greater energy efficiency. The payments out of the Recycle 
Fund are therefore an additional mechanism within the trading system to enhance 
environmental performance. The grant is bound to the speed and extent of the emissions 
reduction and the performance league table and has clearly environmental objectives. In 
particular the existence of the Recycling Fund and the related non- financial incentives will 
allow the UK authorities to determine a stricter cap, thereby obtaining a larger reduction 
of emissions. Such reduction is possible because the organizations covered by the CRC 
normally would disregard costs signals of a stricter cap without recycling and may well 
prefer to rely on the option to buy AAs rather than reducing their own emissions. 
Although the Recycle Fund is a refund mechanism where all revenues are redistributed to 
all participants of the CRC scheme, its distribution – and thereby economic effect – is 
purely dependent on the objective environmental performance of the participating 
companies. 
36. It follows from the above that the scheme is based on competitive behaviour between 
undertakings aiming solely at protection of environment. Such an innovative, purely 
national scheme, was not foreseen at the time of drafting the Guidelines.” 
45 Commission Decision of 17th June 2009, case C41/06. The Commission concluded that: 
“(67) the proposed scheme ‘Modification of the CO2 tax on quota-regulated fuel 
consumption in industry’ constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the 
EC Treaty; (68) Provided that all beneficiaries still pay a tax on each energy source which 
respects the Community minimum tax levels, the aid is declared compatible with Article 
87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty.” 
46M.C. ALONSO GARCÍA, “El nuevo régimen jurídico del mercado europeo de derechos de 
emisión de gases de efecto invernadero”,  Actualidad Administrativa, 2012, forthcoming.   
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mistakes in the calculation of the allocation of allowances: 30 September 
2008, 1 and 6 October 2008, 3 December 2008, 8 April 2009 and 26 January 
2011. Finally, some Decisions refer to the increasing capacity of the 
undertakings and overallocation of allowances: 27 November 2008, 1-2 and 
3 December 2008 and 29 May 2009. 
 
VII. Some brief remarks about Allocation of aviation allowances in 
a wide ETS and the role of competition. 
 
 From 2012 the EU ETS will also include CO2 emissions from civil 
aviation. This means airlines of all nationalities will need allowances to cover 
the emissions from their flights to, from or within the EU. Using emissions 
trading to tackle the fast-growing emissions from the aviation sector is fully 
in International Civil Aviation Organization. In order to mitigate the climate 
impacts of aviation, the EU has decided to impose a cap on CO
2
 emissions 
from all international flights – from or to anywhere in the world – that arrive 
at or depart from an EU airport. 
However, and although, airlines seemed to accept that their inclusion in the 
CDE was necessary for its contribution to addressing climate change, the 
worsening of conditions in which this system will be applied during the 
legislative process - with increasing percentage of auctions of emissions and 
the reduction of average emissions were then determined, and the new 
context of recession, raised the criticism of the major actors of air transport. 
According to the airlines, there has been no serious impact study on the 
emissions auction to support these percentages and, therefore, not been 
assessed its effect on an industry that is mired in a serious economic crisis 
 
It is true that the system can turn into a new source of costs for European 
airlines. 
Furthermore, some aspects of the system, such as trade undergoing the 
emissions at present, with a similar functioning as living oil. This would, for 
airlines, a new variable fluctuable that could endanger their growth. 
 
The EU ETS will cover any aircraft operator, whether EU- or foreign-based, 
operating international flights on routes to, from or between EU airports. All 
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airlines will thus be treated equally. Very light aircraft will not be covered. 
Military, police, customs and rescue flights, flights on state and government 
business, and training or testing flights will also be exempted. Legality of EU 
ETS was subject to extensive consideration during development of the 
legislation. Court case by US Airlines at European Court of Justice on the 21 
December 2011, the European Court of Justice delivered its judgment in a 
legal case brought by some US and Canadian airlines and their trade 
association against the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS. 
 
In principle, this model implies a strong restriction on flights to insular and 
outermost regions, to which access, this is almost the only way of 
transportation (or at least there are not comparable). The issue is 
complicated in these cases because it is common that operators receive 
public aid as compensation for public service obligations. Under terms of 
that section of the Directive, the flights operated under public service 
obligations should be excluded. This aspect should be analyse under the new 
rules.  
 
But the main problem we see regarding competition refers to the fact that 
free allowances can be considered as state aid. The EC has admitted the 
possibility that the free allocation of allowances by the EM concealed aid and 
prove that this aid is contrary to the provisions of Articles 107 and 108 EFFT. 
The Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection 
(2008/C82/01) OJ series C, April 1, 2008, establish the limits and conditions 
for the free allocation of allowances to be classified as State aid compatible 
with the EC Treaty. When the assignment is below market value (which means 
that whenever there is free allocation) is public support.  
 
